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Abstract—Users of Online Social Networks (OSNs) interact
with each other more than ever. In the context of a public
discussion group, people receive, read, and write comments in
response to articles and postings. In the absence of access control
mechanisms, OSNs are a great environment for attackers to
influence others, from spreading phishing URLs, to posting fake
news. Moreover, OSN user behavior can be predicted by social
science concepts which include conformity and the bandwagon
effect. In this paper, we show how social recommendation systems
affect the occurrence of malicious URLs on Facebook. We
exploit temporal features to build a prediction framework, having
greater than 75% accuracy, to predict whether the following
group users’ behavior will increase or not. Included in this
work, we demarcate classes of URLs, including those malicious
URLs classified as creating critical damage, as well as those
of a lesser nature which only inflict light damage such as
aggressive commercial advertisements and spam content. It is our
hope that the data and analyses in this paper provide a better
understanding of OSN user reactions to different categories of
malicious URLs, thereby providing a way to mitigate the influence
of these malicious URL attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The attack vectors that users of Online Social Networks
(OSNs) face have been evolving as the various bad actors
learn to manipulate this new aspect of the cyber landscape.
One of these newly evolving attack vectors is the news
creation and dissemination cycle. Traditionally the structure
for media dissemination was a top-down arrangement, news
was typically published by well-trained reporters and edited
by a skilled team. In this fashion, these professionals acted
as a gatekeeper of sorts, ensuring higher journalistic integrity
and correctness of the news. In contrast, news is now being
created for use and spread on Online Social Networks by users.
This opens the door to the news generation process, and the
associated URLS, to be utilized as nascent attack vectors.
With the modern structuring of this information creation
and consumption process, social recommendation systems play
an increasingly critical role as they determine which users
will see exactly what information based on the characteristics
of the individual users as well as specific features from the
articles. Unfortunately, inappropriate information will diffuse
on user-generated content platforms much more readily than
traditional media, attributable to two primary factors: (1)
The connectivity of social media makes information diffusion
deeper and wider. (2) Users may wittingly or unwittingly boost
inappropriate dissemination cascades with their own comments
on the articles.
The major research efforts in the area of OSN security
are concerned with detecting malicious accounts rather than
normal user accounts. However, attackers can exploit either
newly created fake or existing latent compromised accounts to
avoid state-of-the-art defense schemes since most are based on
verified attacker behavior and trained by machine learning al-
gorithms either by lexical features or accounts characteristics.
Relatively less work has been done to measure and consider
the influence of the actual malicious content. Therefore, our
motivation is based on two research questions: RQ1. For
discussion threads having clearly malicious content, do they
have a larger cascade size when compared to other discussion
threads that do not contain malicious content? RQ2. In a
discussion thread, is there a significant influence between the
prior and the latter comments surrounding a malicious com-
ment? Specifically, we are wondering will audiences change
their behavior when they see a malicious comment which is
being promoted by a social recommendation system.
In this paper, we design two experiments trying to answer
the above two questions. For cascade size between target and
non-target post threads, we evaluate with the bandwagon effect
experiment. The findings indicate that they both basically
follow the same cascade model. However, their final cascade
size are extremely different for at least two reasons: (1) Users
reactions and (2) Social Recommendation Design. Afterwards,
we turned our attention to the fine-grained influence of a user-
generated comment. We define an Influence Ratio (IR) for
every comment to evaluate its influence based on the ratio
over its upcoming activities and its preceding activities. Our
framework achieves more than 75% accuracy on both critical
and light damage URLs in predicting the upcoming activity
increase or decrease.
Our results also indicate the relative position, in context of
the chronological positioning, of a comment plays a critical
role in contributing to the influence that the comment wields.
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Fig. 1: Android apps download links posted to an article about
the threat of Ebola.
For example, Figure 1 1 shows a labeled advertisement URL
occurred in the very late stage (2802 out of 2844 total
comments) while Figure 2 2 shows a labeled pornography URL
occurred near the middle of the comment chronology (470th
comment of 942 total). We found that with regards to position,
critical and those lesser threat level URLs are presenting at
different times in the discussion — the light threat URLs tend
to be posted later chronologically while critical threat URLs
tend to be in the middle of a post’s timeline. This phenomenon
is borne out very obviously in the CNN public page, however
this presentation is not as dramatic on the FOX News. There
are at least two reasons for the chronological disparity between
the different threat level URLs: (1) Users tend to leave the
discussion when they feel there was an obvious ad posted, like
Figure 1. (2) Compared to the lower level threats, attackers
who spread critical malicious URLs act in a more strategic
manner — they choose the most opportune timing to achieve
the greatest amount of influence.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section
II illustrates how Facebook and the Social Recommendation
Systems work. In Section III we define necessary terms and
provide a detailed description for our dataset. The bandwagon
effect cross-validation is described in Section IV. We define
and predict the Influence Ratio in Section V. Related Work
and our Conclusion are given in Section VI and Section VII,
respectively.
II. FACEBOOK AND SOCIAL RECOMMENDATION SYSTEM
In this section, we introduce one of the most popular
online services of social media — Facebook, from it’s humble
beginnings as a sort of simple digitized social yearbook limited
to only certain universities to a worldwide incredibly complex
1post id = 10152998395961509
2post id = 10153908916401509
Fig. 2: Pornography URL posted to comment stream of article
about an LGBT pride parade
and multi-functional platform. We also describe the informa-
tion consumption process between Facebook and OSNs Users.
A. Facebook public pages
Facebook was launched in 2004, initially providing a plat-
form for students to search for people at the same school
and look up friends of friends. Users updated personal in-
formation, likes, dislikes, as well as current activities. While
doing this they also kept track of what others were doing,
and used Facebook to check the relationship availability of
anyone they might meet and were interested in romantically.
3 As Facebook grew quickly, users were not satisfied with
merely following the personal status of their close friends on
the network. Furthermore, users demonstrated an interest in
public affairs and news. For this reason, the public pages
on Facebook were created, and have become places where
users receive news and information selected and promoted
by news feeds, which are constantly updating lists of stories
in the middle of one’s homepage, including stories regarding
(1) friends’ activities on Facebook. (2) articles from pages
where an user is interested (Liked or Followed). (3) articles
that your friends like or comment on from people you are not
friends with. (4) Advertisements from sponsoring companies
and organizations. 4. With these new media publication venues
on Facebook, users interact with strangers on various public
pages — discussing news published by commercial media
companies, announcements by public figures, sharing movie
reviews, gossiping about an actor, or criticizing the poor
performance of a particular sports teams. According to [14],
there are more than 38,831,367 public pages covering multiple
topics including Brands & Products, Local Business & Places
and Companies & Organizations. 5.
3https://www.eonline.com/news/736769/this-is-how-facebook-has-changed-
over-the-past-12-years
4https://www.facebook.com/help/327131014036297/
5https://www.facebook.com/pages/create
B. Social Recommendation System
Most highly trafficked Online Social Media sites contain
some variation of a dynamic social recommendation system
[23]. It is a continuous process cycle, which includes two
entities : Social Computing Platform and Active Users and
the four processes shown in Figure 3. Here we explain the
processes in more detail.
1) Deliver: Large-scale and user-generated data have been
disseminated on OSNs. However, only appropriate in-
formation is delivered to corresponding audiences.
2) Digest: When users see the news, they will be able to
have a chance to join the discussion by actively typing
their opinion, less actively clicking reactions or passively
doing nothing.
3) Derive and Evaluate: Recommendation systems will
collect a large amount of user interaction data and
modify the algorithm to better attract attention from
users (mostly because of attention economy [9]). The
evaluation step gives a chance for Facebook to modify
the social algorithms to deliver more appropriate (Step
1.) information to users. The primary concern for Face-
book is to maximize clicks on advertisements. This is
primarily accomplished by maximizing time spent on
Facebook by the user.
Attackers logically attempt to maximize the influence they
wield for every malicious campaign. In effect, having more
people see their malicious content, click it, interact with it, or
trust it. With the application of behavioral targeting, we believe
the bad actors spread URLs that will be more relevant to audi-
ences, whose patterns could be collected from data mining or
speculation. For example, the collection of bad actors involved
with spreading fake news tend to chronologically target the
planting of their fake news as well as topographically target the
best locations to plant fake news (eg. Politics-related Facebook
pages or articles). While other bad actors run accounts that are
hired by commercial enterprises that have a more limited scope
and primarily care about their business. The common thread
is they all make use of the social recommendation system. We
have seen that Social Recommendation System design actually
increases the damage of malicious URLs since it offers a way
for attackers to spread harmful content at the right place and
at the right time. Vosoughi et al. indicates that false news
is more novel than true news and humans are more likely
to share novel information online [27]. Therefore, the social
recommendation system will boost the ”rich get richer” effect.
III. DATA DESCRIPTION AND LABELING
In this section, we define the necessary terminology used
in this paper. After providing a high level overview of the
discussion groups dataset, we show how we label filtered
URLs into different categories.
A. Terminology
We use the following terminology to describe the concepts
in our work more exactly:
• page: a public discussion group. In this study, we only
consider two main media pages: CNN (page id =
5550296508) and FOX News (pageid = 15704546335) .
• Original Post: an article on a Facebook discussion group.
• Comments: text written in response to an original post.
• Reaction: Emoji to comments or original posts, including
”Like”, ”Love”, ”Haha”, ”Love”, ”Sad” and ”Angry”.
• Post thread: the original post and all corresponding user
activities (Comments and corresponding Reactions), or-
dered by their timestamps.
• Target post thread: post threads which have at least one
comment embedded with malicious URL(s).
• Non-Target Posts: post threads which have no embedded
malicious URLs.
• Time Series TS: TScreated indicates a time period j
following the time of the original post, measured in
minutes. TSfinal refers to the precise time 1 hour after
the original post was created (i.e., final = 60).
• Number of comments Ncomment(post, TSi): the number
of post comments collected at TSi
• Accumulated number of participants
AccNcomment(post, TSi): the number of post comments
between TSi and TSi−1
B. Crawled Dataset
To this end, our data was cataloged with the use of an
open source social crawler called SINCERE 6(Social Interac-
tive Networking and Conversation Entropy Ranking Engine),
which has been created and refined by our research group over
several years. We employed it from 2014 to 2016 to collect
post threads on both CNN and FOX News public pages to see
the difference between left-wing and right-wing discussion.
Detail information was stored, including timestamps of each
comment, Facebook account identification numbers, as well
as the raw text of comments and articles. In total we have
48,087 posts, 88,834,886 comments and 189,460,056 reactions
for both pages. We describe the full dataset in Table I.
C. Labeling URLs
Typically, a URL contains three parts: (1) a protocol,
(2) a host name and a file name. In this paper, we fo-
cus on URLs which use HTTP and HTTPS protocols.
Moreover, we focus on the host name itself. We first
use a well-known Whitelist ’facebook.com’, ’youtube.com’,
’twitter’, ’on.fb.me’, ’en.wikipedia’, ’huffingtonpost.com’,
’foxnews.com’, ’cnn.com’, ’google.com’, ’bbc.co.uk’, ’ny-
times.com’, ’washingtonpost.com’ to do a first-step filter. We
then employ the daily-updated Shalla Blacklist service [1],
which is a collection of URL lists grouped into several
categories intended for the usage with URL filters, to label
and trace the behavior of URL influence. Note that we do not
assume all URLs filtered by Shalla are completely malicious.
Among the 74 categories listed, we manually divided targeted
URLs into two classes: Light and Critical, the explanation of
each category is follows:
6https://github.com/dslfaithdev/SocialCrawler
Fig. 3: The framework of users activities regarding Online Social Media
TABLE I: Data Description
Page Name Total Posts Total Comments Comments with URLs Total Reactions
CNN 20922 11,882,590 412,001 (3.47%) 24,174,160
FOX News 27165 76,952,296 1,026,525 (1.33%) 165,285,896
• Light:
– Advertising: Includes sites offering banners and ad-
vertising companies.
– Shopping: Sites offering online shopping and price
comparisons.
– Gamble : Poker, Casino, Bingo and other chance
games as well as betting sites.
– Porn: Sites with sexual content.
• Critical:
– Download: This covers mostly file-sharing, p2p, tor-
rent sites and drive-by-downloads.
– Hacking: Sites with information and discussions
about security weaknesses and how to exploit them.
– Spyware: Sites that try to actively install software
(or lure the user to do so) in order to spy on user
behavior. This also includes trojan and phishing sites.
– Aggressive: Sites of obvious aggressive content. In-
cludes hate speech and racism.
– Drugs: Sites offering drugs or explaining how to
make drugs (legal and non legal).
– Weapons: Sites offering weapons or accessories for
weapons
– Violence: Sites about killing or harming people or
animals.
We classify others as Benign if they are not in the Whitelist,
Light, or Critical classes. The detailed number of each cate-
gory is listed in Table II.
IV. POST LEVEL INFLUENCE
Heterogeneous posts are updated and refreshed at tremen-
dous speed and include Videos, photos with attractive head-
lines, assorted topics such as international affairs, elections or
entertainment. We are interested in why malicious URLs often
occur in only some post threads. In this section, we applied
the model proposed by Wang et.al [28] to gain insight into
how those malicious URLs may influence the growth of the
conversation.
A. Bandwagon Effect and Attacker cost
A phenomenon known as the bandwagon effect, which
explains how individuals will agree with a larger group of
people who they may not normally agree with, but do so in
order to feel a part of a group, — individuals are more likely to
be with those sub-groups that share similar thoughts but feel
uncomfortable in the presence of minority groups that have
different ideas [2]. Many voting behaviors are related to this
effect, voters may or may not follow their own conscience
to make a voting decision but may just follow the majority
opinion [26].
From the result obtained by [16], when considering the
posts targeted with a comment that includes a malicious URL,
we see the most commonly attacked articles tend to generate
large amounts of discussion. Moreover, targets may be those
suggested by the Facebook social recommendation system to
the attacker.
The following example indicates how a large number of
majority opinions might be identified from a Facebook dis-
cussion. Assume three posts — postA, postB and postC —
have been posted on a public page at around the same time,
the original posters’ identities are irrelevant. Also assume
there exist three different users — userA visits the page and
browses all three posts, has no signals from others for making
a decision to engage with the post, the user subsequently
decides to only comment on postB because it was subjectively
the most interesting one to them. Five minutes later, userB
visits the same page and sees that only postB has a comment.
This user then checks postB first and decides to add their
own reply, either in response to the original post or userA.
Note that until now there are no comments on either postA
or postC . Some short time later, userc checks the page and
finds that postB has more than 10 comments, while postA
and postC still have 0 comments. He then decides to add a
comment to postB since postB is the first post that is pushed
to the user by Facebook because, at that moment, postB has a
TABLE II: URL Data Description
Page Name URL in WhiteList URL in Light URL in Critical URL in Benign
CNN 194,372 3,762 636 213,231
FOX News 503,480 8,125 1,571 513,349
relatively larger share of public attention compared to postA
or postC . This is an example of the information cascade
phenomenon first proposed by Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and
Welch [4], and most social media recommendation systems
intensify this phenomenon — information and user activities
are automatically selected by algorithm, though most users do
not realize this when participating in OSN discussion groups.
B. Prediction Model and Evaluation Method
In order to differentiate the information cascade model
between target and non-target post threads, we will describe
a system designed to use the time series and number of
current comments to predict how many new users are likely
to participate in each respective thread. The Discussion Atmo-
sphere Vector (DAV) [16] defined in our previous work used
the definition of accumulated number of participants given in
Section III, using 5 minutes for the i value and 2 hours for
the tf inal value.
DAV (Post)tn = [AccNcomment(Post, t1),
AccNcomment(Post, t2), ...,
AccNcomment(Post, tn)]
In the bandwagon effect model proposed by Wang et. al
[28], the numbers of comments with respect to each time
window after a post has been created can be used to build
matrices for each public page G to predict the final number
of comments by machine learning and statistical methods. In
other words, two post threads postA and postB are likely to
have the same scale of cascades if in each timestamp i such
that:
DAV (PostA)ti ≈ DAV (PostB)ti
We then defined a distribution matrix D, with each
element Dij representing a set of posts post ∈ G,
including the final number of comments we crawled
Ncomment(post, TSfinal) and aggregate number of comments
j(j = Ncomment(post,TSi)) at time i.
Dij(G) = {Ncomment(post, TSfinal(post))|
j = Ncomment(post, TSi(post));∀post ∈ G}
(1)
Based on the distribution matrix D, we used a bootstrapping
method [10] to construct prediction matrix M .
Mij = Bootstrapping(Dij) (2)
The matrix M is used to create a prediction function Fpredict
that collects two inputs from any new post thread: ob-
served time series TSob(post) and corresponding feature
Ncomment(post, TSob). According to M , we obtain the result
using the following equation:
Fpredict(TSob(post), Ncomment(post, TSob) =
MTSob(post,Ncomment(post,TSob))
(3)
TABLE III: Bandwagon Effect Cross Validation – Target to
Non-Target, Observed time = 120 minutes
Page Name Precision / Predictable (%) Predictable / All (%)
CNN 15,633/15,866 (97%) 15,866/15,869 (99%)
FOX News 17,338/17448 (99%) 17,448/17,453 (99%)
TABLE IV: Bandwagon Effect Cross Validation – Non-Target
to Target, Observed time = 120 minutes
Page Name Precision / Predictable (%) Predictable / All (%)
CNN 5,013/5,014 (99%) 5,014/5,053 (99%)
FOX News 9,706/9,712 (99%) 9,712/9,712 (100%)
C. Result and Discussion
Our Bandwagon cross-validation between Target and Non-
Target post threads are offered in Tables IV and III. Note that
the prediction function can sometimes fail for either of two
reasons: insufficient features for a post to match M in the
testing data or insufficient existing posts within the training
data. In our experiment, we have enough training data, so
unpredictable posts ≈ 1% for both pages are posts which do
not have enough activities for M to predict the final size of
cascade.
Basically there are no obvious differences regarding the first
two hours activities with respect to final number of comments
between Target and Non-Target post threads. This suggests that
malicious URLs did not affect the life cycle of post threads —
people still engaged the target post threads, under the threat
of malicious URLs. On the other hand, our result also indicate
that the Facebook social recommendation system continued to
deliver post threads which have malicious URLs to audiences,
similar to the way it treats normal post threads.
Recall that the Bootstapping method in this experiment is
only providing the lower bound. For example,if M5,5 = 100,
this means any post satisfies 5 comments in the first five
minutes, it would have 100 comments or more. However, 200
and 2000 are both greater than 100, but the scale are not
the same. In order to consider the final cascade of comments
between targets and non-targets, we also conduct two-sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests to compare the distributions
of the final number of comments between those two sets. The
results are shown in Table V and VI. In general, for both the
FOX News and CNN pages, the final number of comments
of Target post threads is obviously greater than Non-Target
ones. There are two main reasons: (1) Attackers are led by the
Facebook Social Recommendation Systems. In other words,
their targets are not chosen by themselves but mostly by Social
Algorithms. (2) Normal users tended to react more than usual
because of those malicious URLs — novel information would
ignite interest to join a discussion. We also noticed that FOX
News attracts more people to join the discussion, rather than
TABLE V: CNN Statistics on the cascade size.
KS-test for target and non-targets: D = 0.068, p ≈ 0.0
N Mean SE Min Max
Target 5,053 1,010 1,558 14 39,929
Non-Target 15,869 427 698 1 35,591
TABLE VI: FOX Statistics on the cascade size.
KS-test for target and non-targets: D = 0.066, p ≈ 0.0
N Mean SE Min Max
Target 9,712 4,712 11,740 24 412,621
Non-Target 17,453 1,786 3,436 1 115,669
CNN (about 4 times the mean of the number of comments per
post threads).
V. INFLUENCE RATIO OF A COMMENT
Post thread is a basic unit to consider the interaction of
users. In previous section we have shown that the final size
of cascade (number of comments) and the first two hours
activities between target posts and non-targets are very similar,
however, the scale are extremely different from KS test. In
this section, we turn our attention to the temporal neighbor —
Users interact with a time period on the same post threads,
even though they are not mutual friends on Facebook.
A. Preceding and Upcoming Activities
Consider an original post released by a news media
outlet on its public page. This post can be a video, a
photo or even just a short paragraph of text. There can
be many users activities toward this particular post. Con-
sider an original article (post). The corresponding com-
ments are C1, C2, ..., Cn, ordered by their created timestamp
(Time(C1), T ime(C2), ..., T ime(Cn)). In order to evaluate
the influence of a comment Ci with its created time Time(Ci),
given a time window ∆T , we define Influence Ratio (IR) as the
log ratio between all activities which occurred in the previous
time window Time(Ci)−∆T and the upcoming time window
Time(Ci) + ∆T .
InfluenceRatio(Ci,∆T ) =
log(
count(activities) ∈ (Time(Ci) + ∆T )
count(activities) ∈ (Time(Ci)−∆T ) )
(4)
we classify the comment itself in the time period (Time(Ci)−
∆T to avoid the denominator becoming zero. Activities
include all comments, likes and reactions. If IR is greater than
0, This means people will be more interested in this post and
this comment in the next time slot Time(Ci) + ∆T .
B. Predict and Evaluate Influence Ratio
The time differences between two consecutive comments
Cn − Cn−1 vary a lot. For example, several studies have
shown that post threads would have a rich get richer [13]
and bandwagon effect [17], which indicates the nearby com-
ments and reactions are critical to interact and influence with
each other — everyone is a potential amplifier. Consider
two users User(Ci) and User(Cj) who contribute Ci and
Cj . If | i − j | is quite close to 1, they would have a
higher chance to interact with each other since the (1) Social
recommendation system delivered this post to both users
because of their past activities and browsing footprints. (2)
They remain online on Social Media at around the same
time (This is not always true since we also need to consider
the time difference between Time(Ci) and Time(Cj). How-
ever, they may not be friends with each other but just have
overlapping active time on Facebook. In order to consider
the volume of specific time period, we define a function
CountActivity(post, [Time(Begin), T ime(After)]) which
refers to all activities (comments, likes, reactions and replies)
for post within Time(Begin) to Time(After). In order to
consider the influence and role of a comment in a post thread,
given an influenced threshold δT and preceding audience
number Nprev , we define Preceding Influenced Vector(PIV)
of a comment Ck in a post thread Post as following:
PIVi(Post, Ck) = CountActivity(Post,
[Time(Ck)− i ∗ δT, T ime(Ck)− (i ∗ 1)δT ])
(5)
Our goal is to predict IR, the volume of the upcoming
time windows. In other words, for any comment Ck in an
article post, the influence ratio problem predicts whether
the upcoming audiences will be greater than the preceding
audiences via a classifier — c−−− > target, nontarget —
based on one set of PIV (Post, Ck). Hence, for two arbitrary
comments Cm of Postm and Cn of Postn, they will be more
likely to have the same trend for the upcoming number of
activities such that:
PIV (Postm, Cm) ≈ PIV (Postn, Cn)
We use comments with benign URLs as a training data,
trying to predict the IR trends for both light URLs and critical
URLs. We set time window δT as 1 minute and the number of
components of PIV as 60, which means that for each comment,
we assume the time period up to 1 hour will influence the IR.
We then normalized the input PIV to prevent overfitting. As
output, we labeled the positive value of IR as increase while
negative value of IR as decrease. We applied two popular
machine learning classifiers (1) Adaboost (2) Gaussian Naive
Baynes and from scikit-learn [22]. For Adaboost, we set the
number of estimators = 50 and learning rate = 1. The detailed
results are shown in Tables VII and VIII. Overall we can
achieve greater than 75% F1-score on predicting the Influence
ratio for both Light and Critical URLs, and the result for
Light category is better than Critical category. Moreover, we
summarize our findings as follows:
• CNN vs. FOX News: There are no obvious difference
between CNN and FOX News with regards to predicting
IR for the more critical threats versus the lower threat
malicious campaigns. We think the reason may be both
CNN and FOX News Feeds were controlled by the same
social recommendation system. Hence, user activities
TABLE VII: Influence Ratio Prediction – Benign to Light,
Observed time = 60 minutes, δT = 1 minute
Precision Recall F1-score Number of Samples
CNN
Naive Baynes
Decrease 0.86 0.49 0.62 2,267
Increase 0.53 0.88 0.66 1,495
avg/total 0.73 0.64 0.64 3,762
Adaboost
Decrease 0.84 0.80 0.82 2,267
Increase 0.72 0.77 0.74 1,495
avg/total 0.79 0.79 0.79 3,762
FOX News
Naive Baynes
Decrease 0.69 0.42 0.52 3,638
Increase 0.65 0.85 0.74 4,487
avg/total 0.67 0.66 0.64 8,125
Adaboost
Decrease 0.81 0.69 0.74 3,638
Increase 0.78 0.87 0.82 4,487
avg/total 0.79 0.79 0.79 8,125
TABLE VIII: Influence Ratio Prediction – Benign to Critical,
Observed time = 60 minutes, δT = 1 minute
Precision Recall F1-score Number of Samples
CNN
Naive Baynes
Decrease 0.88 0.42 0.57 318
Increase 0.62 0.94 0.75 318
avg/total 0.75 0.68 0.66 636
Adaboost
Decrease 0.83 0.71 0.77 318
Increase 0.75 0.86 0.80 318
avg/total 0.79 0.79 0.79 636
FOX News
Naive Baynes
Decrease 0.59 0.48 0.53 581
Increase 0.73 0.81 0.77 990
avg/total 0.68 0.69 0.68 1,571
Adaboost
Decrease 0.75 0.56 0.64 581
Increase 0.78 0.89 0.83 990
avg/total 0.77 0.77 0.77 1,571
with respect to temporal features can be predicted with
the same amount of ease on either feed.
• Increase vs. Decrease: For most cases, the F1-score on
predicting increase is better than decrease (CNN benign
to Critical and FOX News both cases). We think it is
related to our previous experiment regarding bandwagon
effect. We also notice that on the CNN page, the IR of
light malicious campaigns tend to decrease, which can
either be audiences left the discussion because of the
URL or the attacker strategies are inefficient to cause
popularity.
• Classifiers: Better results were obtained by Adaboost. For
social media data, since PIVs are not independent with
respect to one another, Naive Baynes does not work well
given the dependent variable constant. In other words,
when considering group behaviors on OSNs, we believe
that Reinforcement Learning classifier is better than
Naive Baynes, which is based on probabilistic classifiers.
Fig. 4: CDFs of different categories occurrences plotted
against life stages of targeted threads
C. Life Cycle stage
We noticed that the temporal ordering of activities on
post threads are quite interesting. The audience generally
rapidly increases to the peak, and then growth of the audience
decays more slowly as time goes on. Figure 5 visualizes the
relationship among ratio, IR, and elapsed time from the last
comment. We model the life cycle of post threads into three
stages:
1) Rapid growth: On the facebook page for FOX News,
there is an obvious watershed at 50%: From the first
comment to about the midway point in post threads,
many users join the discussion; usually in the next time
window each comment will have 5 times the activities as
the previous time window, and the time difference with
last comment is usually smaller than 1 minute. However,
on the CNN page, we observe that IR experiences
several huge discussions, the reason may be people
provide lots of reactions for some interesting comments.
2) Slow Decay: For both CNN and FOX News, we ob-
served that from 50% to about 85%, the volume of
comments faces an obvious decline. At the same time,
IR lightly decays and elapsed time becomes larger.
3) Dormancy: At this stage, the thread has basically passed
it’s shelf life. The elapsed time goes up to more than ten
minutes while the IR has fallen to almost 0.
We also noticed that attackers are more likely to spread
malicious URLs at either the Slowly Decay or Dormancy
stages on CNN, while on FOX, the ratio seems to be uniform
distribution, as Figure 4 shows.
D. Attackers’ footprint
In addition to the post thread life cycle we described, we
are also interested in the user’s other activities. Are they
actively expressing their opinions, or just acting as a one-
time inappropriate information generator? We consider user
activities on more than 40,000 public pages around the world
from 2011 to 2016 on Facebook. Figure 6 shows that no matter
the numbers of comments, number of likes or number of re-
actions, those users who spread Critical-type malicious URLs
(a) CNN (b) FOX News
Fig. 5: Life cycle of two pages regarding IR and elapsed time
(a) CNN
(b) FOX
Fig. 6: Users General Activities on Facebook Discussion Groups
occur more often than benign and Light-type users. Considered
from their purpose, we noticed that Light-type users tend
to lure users to commercial websites. However, Critical-type
users comments usually advocate relatively personal belief and
values — which makes them heavier Facebook user and tend
to influence others. However, on FOX News, only Light-type
users have less activities than the other two, so there is no
obvious difference between Critical-Type users and Benign
Users.
VI. RELATED WORK
Security issues surrounding OSN platforms have been grow-
ing in importance and profile due to the increasing number
of users (and subsequent potential targets) of social media
applications. Our related work mainly falls into two categories:
(1) Popularity on social media; and (2) cyber attack techniques
on social media.
A. Information Diffusion and Influence
Castillo et al. shows different categories of news (News
vs. In-depth) will have different life cycles regarding social
media reactions [5]. In fact, there are lots of works aiming
at observing and predicting the final cascade size of a given
post or topic. According to Cheng et al., these factors may
include content features, authors features, resharer features and
temporal features which make a cascade size more predictable
[8]. As to the last issue, several papers exploit the reaction for
a given fixed time frame to predict whether a post thread will
be popular or not [15] [18] [25].
Cascade can also be interpreted from the audience’s per-
spective. I.e., why do people spend lots of time on social
media to share her own opinions to public. Marwick et
al. proposed a many-to-many communication model through
which individuals conceptualize an imagined audience evoked
through their content [20]. Hall et al. [12] demonstrates the
impact of the individual on an information cascade. In the
interactive communication model [6], in order to participate
in the so-called attention economy, people want to attract
eyeballs in a media-saturated, information-rich world and to
influence audiences to like their comments / photos [11] [19]
[24]. Hence, users strategically formulate their profile and
participate in many discussion groups to increase attention.
B. Cyber attack Analysis on Social Media
Though increasing importance has been attached to security
issues on social media, most works focus on pursuing a perfect
classifier to detect malicious accounts or users with commonly
used profile characteristics such as age, number of followers,
geo-location and total number of activities [3] [21]. with the
development of new security threats on social media such
as cyberbullying or fake news, recent research uses social
science to understand collective human behavior. Cheng et al.
studied the activity differences between organized groups and
individuals [8]. Charzakou et al. noted people who spread hate
are more engaged than typical users [7]. Vosoughi et al. found
that false news was more novel than true news mainly because
of humans, not robots [27].
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we describe our work regarding attacker inten-
tion and influence from large-scale malicious URLs campaigns
using the public Facebook Discussion Groups dataset. Specif-
ically, we focus on examining the differing characteristics
between CNN and FOX News discussion threads ranging from
2014 to 2016.
We describe how social recommendation systems work for
both target and non-target threads. Moreover, we define an
Influence Ratio(IR) for every visible comment on Facebook
based on the ratio between the upcoming activities and the
preceding activities. We also propose a context-free prediction
system to predict whether the trends will decrease or increase
with a F1-score over 75%. From these results, we perform
an in-depth analysis on different categories of malicious cam-
paigns. Compared to those comments embedded with more
critical level threats such as malicious URLs, some lower level
threats, such as advertising or commercial shopping URLs
appeared at the very end of the discussion thread. The IR
for those commercial sites for at least two reasons. (1) People
just ignored those since they already know it only hinders
the readability. (2) People do not want to check those posts
anymore. However, the program bot did not update to the new-
coming information.
The initial results we obtained provide us new insight
regarding how malicious URLs influence both post thread life
cycle and audience activities with the Facebook social recom-
mendation algorithm. Our current observations enables us to
reconsider new response strategies in handling inappropriate
information on social media.
REFERENCES
[1] Shalla secure services Shalla’s Blacklists. http://www.shallalist.de.
Accessed: 2018-08-27.
[2] Vernon L Allen. Situational factors in conformity1. In Advances in
experimental social psychology, volume 2, pages 133–175. Elsevier,
1965.
[3] Mansour Alsaleh, Abdulrahman Alarifi, Abdul Malik Al-Salman, Mo-
hammed Alfayez, and Abdulmajeed Almuhaysin. Tsd: Detecting sybil
accounts in twitter. In Machine Learning and Applications (ICMLA),
2014 13th International Conference on, pages 463–469. IEEE, 2014.
[4] Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer, and Ivo Welch. A theory of
fads, fashion, custom, and cultural change as informational cascades.
Journal of political Economy, 100(5):992–1026, 1992.
[5] Carlos Castillo, Mohammed El-Haddad, Ju¨rgen Pfeffer, and Matt Stem-
peck. Characterizing the life cycle of online news stories using social
media reactions. In Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on
Computer supported cooperative work & social computing, pages 211–
223. ACM, 2014.
[6] Alphonse Chapanis. Interactive human communication. Scientific
American, 232(3):36–46, 1975.
[7] Despoina Chatzakou, Nicolas Kourtellis, Jeremy Blackburn, Emiliano
De Cristofaro, Gianluca Stringhini, and Athena Vakali. Hate is not
binary: Studying abusive behavior of# gamergate on twitter. In Pro-
ceedings of the 28th ACM conference on hypertext and social media,
pages 65–74. ACM, 2017.
[8] Justin Cheng, Lada Adamic, P Alex Dow, Jon Michael Kleinberg, and
Jure Leskovec. Can cascades be predicted? In Proceedings of the 23rd
international conference on World wide web, pages 925–936. ACM,
2014.
[9] Thomas H Davenport and John C Beck. The attention economy:
Understanding the new currency of business. Harvard Business Press,
2001.
[10] Bradley Efron and Robert J Tibshirani. An introduction to the bootstrap.
CRC press, 1994.
[11] Charles Fairchild. Building the authentic celebrity: The idol phe-
nomenon in the attention economy. Popular Music and Society,
30(3):355–375, 2007.
[12] Robert T Hall, Joshua S White, and Jeremy Fields. Social relevance:
toward understanding the impact of the individual in an information cas-
cade. In Cyber Sensing 2016, volume 9826, page 98260C. International
Society for Optics and Photonics, 2016.
[13] Ellen J Helsper and Alexander JAM Van Deursen. Do the rich get
digitally richer? quantity and quality of support for digital engagement.
Information, Communication & Society, 20(5):700–714, 2017.
[14] Yunfeng Hong, Yu-Cheng Lin, Chun-Ming Lai, S Felix Wu, and
George A Barnett. Profiling facebook public page graph. In 2018 Inter-
national Conference on Computing, Networking and Communications
(ICNC), pages 161–165. IEEE, 2018.
[15] Andrey Kupavskii, Liudmila Ostroumova, Alexey Umnov, Svyatoslav
Usachev, Pavel Serdyukov, Gleb Gusev, and Andrey Kustarev. Prediction
of retweet cascade size over time. In Proceedings of the 21st ACM
international conference on Information and knowledge management,
pages 2335–2338. ACM, 2012.
[16] Chun-Ming Lai, Xiaoyun Wang, Yunfeng Hong, Yu-Cheng Lin, S Felix
Wu, Patrick McDaniel, and Hasan Cam. Attacking strategies and
temporal analysis involving facebook discussion groups. In Network
and Service Management (CNSM), 2017 13th International Conference
on, pages 1–9. IEEE, 2017.
[17] Jieun Lee and Ilyoo B Hong. Predicting positive user responses to social
media advertising: The roles of emotional appeal, informativeness, and
creativity. International Journal of Information Management, 36(3):360–
373, 2016.
[18] Zongyang Ma, Aixin Sun, and Gao Cong. On predicting the popularity
of newly emerging hashtags in twitter. Journal of the Association for
Information Science and Technology, 64(7):1399–1410, 2013.
[19] Alice E Marwick. Instafame: Luxury selfies in the attention economy.
Public culture, 27(1 (75)):137–160, 2015.
[20] Alice E Marwick and Danah Boyd. I tweet honestly, i tweet passionately:
Twitter users, context collapse, and the imagined audience. New media
& society, 13(1):114–133, 2011.
[21] Zachary Miller, Brian Dickinson, William Deitrick, Wei Hu, and
Alex Hai Wang. Twitter spammer detection using data stream clustering.
Information Sciences, 260:64–73, 2014.
[22] Fabian Pedregosa, Gae¨l Varoquaux, Alexandre Gramfort, Vincent
Michel, Bertrand Thirion, Olivier Grisel, Mathieu Blondel, Peter Pretten-
hofer, Ron Weiss, Vincent Dubourg, Jake Vanderplas, Alexandre Passos,
David Cournapeau, Matthieu Brucher, Matthieu Perrot, and E´douard
Duchesnay. Scikit-learn: Machine learning in python. J. Mach. Learn.
Res., 12:2825–2830, November 2011.
[23] Francesco Ricci, Lior Rokach, and Bracha Shapira. Introduction to
recommender systems handbook. In Recommender systems handbook,
pages 1–35. Springer, 2011.
[24] Theresa M Senft. Camgirls: Celebrity and community in the age of
social networks. Peter Lang, 2008.
[25] Oren Tsur and Ari Rappoport. What’s in a hashtag?: content based
prediction of the spread of ideas in microblogging communities. In
Proceedings of the fifth ACM international conference on Web search
and data mining, pages 643–652. ACM, 2012.
[26] Bram Van Ginneken, Arnaud AA Setio, Colin Jacobs, and Francesco
Ciompi. Off-the-shelf convolutional neural network features for pul-
monary nodule detection in computed tomography scans. In Biomedical
Imaging (ISBI), 2015 IEEE 12th International Symposium on, pages
286–289. IEEE, 2015.
[27] Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy, and Sinan Aral. The spread of true and
false news online. Science, 359(6380):1146–1151, 2018.
[28] Keith C Wang, Chun-Ming Lai, Teng Wang, and S Felix Wu. Band-
wagon effect in facebook discussion groups. In Proceedings of the ASE
BigData & SocialInformatics 2015, page 17. ACM, 2015.
